Introduction
Offshoring, or the sourcing of inputs from abroad, is one of the most debated features of economic globalisation. Firms split up their value chains and relocate those activities which they perform with less efficiency to foreign affiliates or to external foreign suppliers.
Numerous studies have documented the rapid growth in offshoring over the last decades (see e.g. Hummels, Ishii, and Yi, 2001 or Amiti and Wei, 2005) . While offshoring has for a long time been limited to material inputs, the last decade has also witnessed an increase in offshoring of services, a trend that has been triggered by the revolution in information and communication technologies (Blinder, 2006) .
In the public perception offshoring is often associated with layoffs, wage reductions, and a rise in wage inequality. These fears have even led Germany to elect outsourcing in 1996
as "unword of the year". Indeed there is evidence of at least some adverse labour market effects. In particular, offshoring is blamed to penalise low skilled workers since their jobs often involve routine activities which are more easily offshorable than the activities of high skilled workers (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Geishecker and Görg, 2008) . Blinder (2006 Blinder ( , 2009 ) has caused alarm with estimates of about 25 per cent of American Jobs that are potentially exposed to offshoring.
In light of the anxiety about job losses and wage reductions, research has been mostly focused on the labour market effects of offshoring, while there is only a small literature on the productivity effects of offshoring. I argue that the importance of this aspect has been overlooked. First, productivity is an important driver of economic growth and hence interesting in its own right. Second, recent theoretical studies show that there are positive feedback effects on the labour markets provided that offshoring raises productivity: According to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) the wages of unskilled workers may rise despite their vulnerability to offshoring if the productivity effect induced by offshoring is sufficiently large; Mitra and Ranyan (2010) show that due to the presence of productivity effects offshoring may decrease unemployment and increase wages; Kohler and Wrona (2010) identify conditions under which job creation dominates job destruction in the presence of productivity effects. Hence, analysing the offshoring-productivity link is important to better understand the feedback effects on the labour markets.
The existing literature on this topic provides some evidence that offshoring can increase productivity, but the identified effects are quite heterogeneous depending on the analysed country, the type of firms (e.g. exporters versus non-exporters) or the type of offshored inputs (materials or services): 1 Görg and Hanley (2005) find that material offshoring has contributed to an increase in the productivity of exporters with low export intensities in the Irish electronics sector. Egger and Egger (2006) find that offshoring lowers the productivity of low-skilled workers in the short run, but raises their productivity in the long run. Görg, Hanley, and Strobl (2008) find that service offshoring enhances the productivity of exporting firms in the Irish manufacturing sector. Hijzen, Inui, and Todo (2008) show for Japanese firms that offshoring to foreign affiliates raises productivity, while offshoring to external suppliers has no such effect. Amiti and Wei (2009) find that offshoring increases productivity, with service offshoring accounting for 10% and material offshoring accounting for 5% of the productivity growth in the United States. Winkler (2010) finds that service offshoring increases the productivity of German manufacturing industries, when controlling for domestic outsourcing. Wagner (2011) finds some evidence for positive productivity effects for German firms using a matching approach.
A criticism which applies to most studies in this literature is that the interpretation of the central offshoring measure is ambiguous. Offshoring is widely defined as the share of imported inputs in total inputs and is measured at the industry-level through a combination of input-output tables and import data (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996) . The offshoring measure per se does not allow distinguishing whether internal production is moved out to foreign suppliers (offshoring) or to domestic suppliers (domestic outsourcing), or whether domestic suppliers are replaced by foreign suppliers (supplier change). See Castellani, de Benedictis, and Horgos (2011) for a detailed analysis of this problem.
In the present study I provide stylized facts on offshoring in Western Europe taking into account this important distinction. I show that services which were previously done internally have been offshored and outsourced domestically. For material inputs, by contrast, I
find also evidence of a systematic replacement of domestic by foreign suppliers. Overall the share of internal production has gone down by 4.5 percentage points between 1995 and 2008, which raises the question whether firms achieved productivity gains through this specialisation effort. I address this question by combining industry offshoring data with a firm panel. Using fixed effects regressions and an instrumental variable approach I find that offshoring of non-core activities has led to productivity gains whereas offshoring of core activities and domestic outsourcing have had no such effects. The estimated productivity gains are in particular driven by offshoring to low-wage countries and by the gains of multinational firms.
1 See Olsen (2006) for a detailed survey of the offshoring-productivity literature.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses possible channels for productivity effects, section 3 illustrates how offshoring is measured and provides stylized facts on offshoring in Western Europe, section 4 describes the empirical model, section 5 presents the regression results, and section 6 concludes.
Channels for productivity effects
To motivate the analysis of productivity effects I discuss in the following different channels through which offshoring can affect productivity: 2 First, a static efficiency gain may arise when firms focus on their core competencies and offshore their less productive activities to foreign suppliers. Offshoring should be therefore all the more beneficial the less productively the activity is done internally. For instance, one may expect that business services offshoring by a manufacturer bears a greater potential for productivity gains than offshoring of its core production activities. Second, offshoring may also come along with restructuring measures which reduce inefficiencies. For instance, offshoring may induce firms to reorganize the way in which tasks are bundled or to improve the communication and reporting system between departments. Third, offshoring firms may benefit from learning externalities which arise due to the interaction with foreign suppliers. For instance, workers may learn about new software packages or gain knowledge about technologies used by the foreign supplier. Fourth, offshoring may raise productivity if the imported input varieties are of higher quality or better match with the specific needs of the firm. Fifth, in Glass and Saggi (2001) offshoring to low wage countries lowers the marginal production costs and raises profits, which creates resources for additional R&D investments. Thus, offshoring may indirectly raise productivities through an increase in innovation activities. Görg and Hanley (2011) provide empirical support for this hypothesis on the basis of Irish plant-level data. Sixth, offshoring may induce general equilibrium effects if realised productivity gains spill over to other firms, or if offshoring induces tougher competition and selection effects in their markets.
Note that the relevance of individual productivity channels cannot be evaluated in this study. In particular, effects for offshoring firms cannot be isolated from general equilibrium effects on competitors or upstream and downstream firms, because offshoring is not observed at the firm level. Yet, this study can provide an indication of heterogeneous effects for different types of firms by combining the industry-level offshoring data with a firm panel.
3.
Offshoring and domestic outsourcing 
In a first step I distinguish three offshoring variables by restricting the numerator of equation (1) Western European countries considered in this study the time coverage is almost complete (Timmer et al., 2012, p.69) . This reduces considerably the measurement bias arising from the imputation of missing data. Geishecker and Görg, 2008) . However, offshoring variables scaled with non-energy inputs or with value added are hard to interpret because both variables are affected by changes from internal production to domestic outsourcing (Geishecker, 2007) .
To resolve these ambiguities I choose output as the denominator.
Third, the distinction between domestic and foreign inputs is achieved in WIOD through an imputation method which dispenses with the traditional type of proportionality assumption, which is present in standard input-output tables of imports. According to the proportionality assumption every industry imports a specific input in the same proportion as the whole economy. It is well known that this assumption is quite restrictive (Winkler and Milberg, 2009; Feenstra and Jensen, 2012) . WIOD is based on a weaker type of proportionality assumption which allows import shares to differ between the three use categories intermediates, final consumption, and investment.
Patterns of offshoring and domestic outsourcing
The following part provides an overview of offshoring patterns in Western Europe's manufacturing industries between 1995 and 2008. To account for differences in the size of industries all observations are generally weighted by industry output. originates from internal production, 28% are due to domestically outsourced inputs, and 17% are due to offshored inputs. Domestic outsourcing is further distinguished into core activities (10.0%), non-core activities (9.6%) and services (7.9%). Offshoring is distinguished into core activities (8.9%), non-core activities (7.1%) and services (1.1%). A first stylized fact is, thus, that material inputs are offshored and domestically outsourced to a similar degree, whereas services are predominantly outsourced domestically. This can be regarded as evidence that many services are not yet tradable over longer distances. In particular, this may be due to services that require regular face-to-face contact with customers, or due to services that involve non-routine activities (Blinder, 2009) .
Furthermore, table 1 shows that between 1995 and 2008 offshoring of core activities has increased by 2.5 percentage points (pp) and offshoring of non-core activities has increased by 1.8 pp. This increase in material offshoring has coincided with a decrease in internal production but also with a decrease in the domestic outsourcing measure. This suggests that two quite different phenomena have occurred at the same time: First, internal production of materials has been partly moved out to foreign suppliers (genuine offshoring). Second, domestic suppliers have been partly replaced by foreign suppliers (supplier change). For services the patterns are somewhat different. Service offshoring has increased by 0.4 pp, domestic service outsourcing has increased by 0.6 pp, and internal value added has decreased.
This suggests that internal services have been moved out both to domestic suppliers (genuine domestic outsourcing) and to foreign suppliers (genuine offshoring).
9 Table 2 shows country-level changes in the composition of output between 1995 and
2008, and table 3 shows the corresponding industry-level changes. The numbers are in percentage points. Overall, tables 2 and 3 show that the general offshoring patterns identified above hold for most of the countries and industries individually. One of the few exceptions is the United Kingdom, where internal production has remained constant and domestic material outsourcing has fallen sharply. Here the rise in the material offshoring variables seems to be predominantly the result of supplier changes rather than genuine offshoring. The table shows that the share of internal production has been similar for the two markets in 1995 (each about 33%), but has decreased considerably faster in Western Europe compared to the US (-4.5 versus -1.2 pp). The numbers suggest that in both markets internal services have been moved out to domestic suppliers and to foreign suppliers. However, with respect to material inputs, the numbers suggest that Western Europe has moved out internal production to foreign suppliers whereas the United States has mainly realized supplier changes.
The tables 5 and 6 show offshoring trends in terms of supplier countries. Table 5 shows offshoring intensities for three groups of supplier countries -Western Europe, other high-income OECD countries, and the rest of the world (ROW). Table 6 shows the relative share of each of these groups in total offshoring. A stylized fact is that material and service offshoring have increased for all three supplier regions. This suggests that offshoring costs must have generally fallen. Another stylized fact is that offshoring from ROW has gained 9 Note that the increase in service offshoring and domestic service outsourcing could be also due to newly created services. It is not possible to verify this possibility with input-output data as the composition of internal production (i.e. the share of internally provide services, core activities, and non-core activities) is unknown. considerably from its relative importance as a supplier of materials. Europe's share in total material offshoring has strongly decreased, whereas its share in total service offshoring has slightly increased.
To sum up I highlight some key stylized facts: a) Offshoring has increased throughout virtually all countries and industries in Western Europe between 1995 and 2008, and it has increased with respect to high-wage and low-wage supplier countries. b) The observed increase in material offshoring reflects genuine offshoring as well as supplier changes. This increase has occurred for core activities and non-core activities. c) With respect to services we observe genuine domestic outsourcing and genuine offshoring, while there is no evidence of systematic supplier changes. d) The importance of domestic outsourcing relative to offshoring is considerably higher for services than for materials, suggesting that many services are still less tradeable over longer distances. e) Overall, the share of internal production has gone down by 4.5 percentage points. This raises in particular the question whether firms achieved productivity gains through this specialisation effort.
Empirical strategy
For the empirical analysis I combine the offshoring data with a firm panel spanning the period 1996 to 2008. In this setup an increase in offshoring captures an aggregate offshoring trend, which does not imply that all firms within a country-industry cell are involved in offshoring.
Hence, the regressions capture average productivity effects comprising the effects for offshoring firms and the effects for their competitors. To capture some of the heterogeneity present within country-industry cells, I introduce an additional firm-level variable and interact this variable with offshoring. In particular, I estimate in this way whether productivity effects differ between multinationals and non-multinationals.
TFP model
In the first step I estimate standard Cobb-Douglas production functions:
where VA, K, L are the logarithms of value added, capital, and labour, and where i and t are indices for firms and years. The parameters β K and β L are capital and labour intensities. To allow for differences in technologies across industries, the production functions are estimated separately for 98 three-digit manufacturing industries j. The residuals are extracted and used in the following as the measure of total factor productivity (TFP). See the appendix for the TFP regression results and summary statistics. given by the number of employees and tangible fixed assets. The sample is restricted to firms with more than five employees, value added larger than 100,000 Euro, and tangible capital larger than 5,000 Euros. To avoid outlier problems I drop the 2% of the observations with the largest (absolute) residuals in the TFP regressions, and then re-estimate the TFPs.
Note that the dataset is not representative because reporting requirements vary across countries, as can be seen from table 11. Spain and Italy are overrepresented in the data, and also the average firm characteristics such as the capital stock or the number of employees vary considerably across countries. These are certainly limitations of the data. Yet, the crosscountry differences should play a minor role for the econometric analysis, as the fixed effects regressions use only the within-firm variation in TFP. Also, I conduct robustness checks on subsamples, for instance by excluding Spain and Italy. 10 The TFP estimations were also conducted with the Levinsohn-Petrin method to account for a possible simultaneity bias. Yet, this caused partly implausible point estimates for some of the industries, such as negative coefficients for capital. For this reason the following analysis is based on simple OLS estimates of TFP. Furthermore, I conduct robustness checks with an alternative TFP measure derived from OLS regressions of model (4) plus additional firm fixed effects.
Offshoring model
In Note some particular features of the multinationality dummy: MNE is one either if a firm owns one or more foreign subsidiaries or if the firm is itself owned by a foreign firm.
Ownership is defined in terms of a benchmark of 50 per cent of the firms' shares, and it includes direct as well as indirect ownership. Note further that the information on shareholders and subsidiaries is only observable for the most recent period in the data.
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Therefore I assume that the MNE status does not change over time, which implies for the fixed effects regressions that the main effect of multinationality (β M ) is fully cancelled out by the firm-fixed effects (µ i ). The interaction effects between multinationality and offshoring, which are of primary interest in this context, are not affected, though. The coefficient vector β MO thus captures additional productivity effects for multinational firms vis-à-vis nonmultinationals.
Possible endogeneity problems are addressed in the following way: First, I reduce the potential for omitted variable bias by controlling for domestic outsourcing. In this way I avoid confounding offshoring with domestic outsourcing or with supplier changes. 12 This is important because I expect that genuine offshoring has the largest productivity effects. In particular, I expect that offshoring firms focus themselves on a reduced set of (core) activities and may thus benefit from increased specialisation. Most of the existing offshoring literature using input-output data does not control for domestic outsourcing, and may thus have problems of omitted variable bias.
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Second, in the full specifications of the regression I account for country-specific productivity trends by including country-year interaction dummies rather than simple year fixed effects. This should further reduce omitted variable potential problems.
Third, I address potential reverse causality problems through an instrumental variable strategy. A reverse causality bias could arise due to selection effects in offshoring as suggested by e.g. Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Wagner (2011) . In this strand of the literature highly productive firms have been found to be more likely to engage in offshoring than less productive firms. In the context of this study the reverse causality problem is attenuated by the fact that the independent variables are measured at a higher level of aggregation than the dependent variable, as in Geishecker and Görg (2008) . Still, I make use 11 In order to trace ownership changes over time, an attempt was made to use ownership information from past editions of the Amadeus database, where each of these editions would provide the ownership information at the current point in time. However, this strategy was discarded after careful inspection of the data, since Amadeus does not regularly update the ownership information and since the coverage for these variables is small in the earlier editions. 12 An increase in offshoring implies by construction a decrease in the internal production if domestic outsourcing is held constant. of an instrumental variable estimation. As instruments I use world offshoring measures for core, non-core, and service activities, and their interaction with the MNE dummy variable.
These world offshoring measures are constructed as output-weighted averages of offshoring in all countries covered by WIOD. Changes in world offshoring reflect changes in offshoring costs around the world. Hence, I expect the instruments to be correlated with offshoring in a given country. Moreover, I expect the instruments to be exogenous because it is unlikely that firms' productivities affect world offshoring.
14

5.
Regression results Table 7 shows the results from the fixed effects regressions. In the first specification total factor productivity is regressed only on the offshoring variables and time dummies. The coefficient for offshoring of non-core activities is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. The corresponding coefficients for core activities and services are statistically insignificant. In the second specification I replace the time dummies through country-year interaction dummies to account for country-specific productivity trends that are not due to offshoring. The results remain qualitatively the same as before but the adjusted R-squared is higher than before. Hence, I keep the country-year dummies in the further specifications.
In the third specification I control additionally for domestic outsourcing. The coefficient for offshoring of non-core activities remains positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Additionally, service offshoring is positive and significant at the 5% level and domestic outsourcing of services is negative and significant at the 10% level. Hence, this
shows that controlling for domestic outsourcing has consequences for the way we do interpret the productivity effects of offshoring.
In specification four I interact offshoring with a dummy variable for multinational firms. Offshoring of non-core activities and service offshoring remain positive and significant and the coefficient of domestic service outsourcing remains negative. Additionally, the coefficients of the interaction terms for non-core activities and services are positive and significant. This suggests that there is an additional gain for multinational firms compared to non-multinationals.
In specification five and six I use instrumental variables fixed effects regression.
Specification five includes year fixed effects, and specification six includes country-year fixed effects. The used instruments are the lagged and contemporaneous values of world offshoring 14 It is possible, though, that industry specific shocks jointly determine firm productivities and world offshoring, in which case the instruments may become invalid. For instance, one may think of a technological invention which raises firm productivity and offshoring simultaneously. While I cannot address this problem in a general way, I am able to rule out biases related to technology by controlling for R&D intensities. Overall, I interpret the results as follows. Offshoring of non-core activities and service offshoring appear to have contributed to an increase in productivity, while there is no productivity effect due to offshoring of core activities. This result is consistent with the interpretation that productivity effects arise due to an induced specialisation. Manufacturing firms that move out services or non-core production activities to foreign suppliers benefit from the termination of their relatively unproductive activities, which allows them to specialise more on their relatively productive core activities.
Furthermore, we also see additional productivity effects for multinational firms in some of the specifications. In the IV regressions there is an additional effect from service offshoring and in the simple fixed effects regressions there is also an additional effect from offshoring of non-core activities. This may be due to the fact that the MNE dummy is correlated with firm-level offshoring. Such a correlation is likely to exist because multinationals have been shown to possess more and better information about foreign markets and may therefore face lower sunk costs of offshoring (see e.g. Görg, Hanley, and Strobl 2008) . In the extreme case that this correlation was 100% the interaction term would pick up the additional productivity gains for offshoring firms vis-à-vis non-offshoring firms. Still, there may be alternative explanations for this effect. For instance, MNEs could have systematically higher management skills, which allow them to adjust faster to changes in the general sourcing patterns.
In table 8 I check the robustness of the results with respect to several adjustments: A possible explanation for the differential effect is that offshoring to low-wage countries might be particularly driven by cost reduction motives, while offshoring to high-wage countries might be driven by other factors, such as the location of suitable suppliers or the firms' market access strategies.
Conclusion
The standard Feenstra/Hanson-type offshoring measures have been criticised because, by construction, offshoring cannot be accurately distinguished from domestic outsourcing and supplier changes (Castellani et al., 2011) . Using data from the World Input Output Database (WIOD) this study analyses these variables systematically, and provides stylized facts on offshoring and domestic outsourcing in nine European countries between 1995 and 2008.
Furthermore, I combine the offshoring data with a manufacturing firm panel and estimate the productivity effects of service and material offshoring, while controlling for domestic outsourcing and supplier changes.
The main stylized facts are as follows: Offshoring has increased throughout virtually all countries and industries in Western Europe and it has increased with respect to different types of supplier countries, though strongest for low-wage supplier countries. The observed increase in material offshoring measures reflects genuine offshoring as well as a substitution of domestic by foreign suppliers. With respect to services inputs there is evidence for domestic outsourcing and offshoring. Overall, the share of internal production has fallen by 4.5 percentage points between 1995 and 2008, thus evoking the question whether firms achieved productivity gains through this specialisation effort.
This question has been adressed through estimations based on combined industry and firm-level data. The main results are as follows: Offshoring of services and non-core manufacturing activities have contributed to an increase in productivity, while offshoring of core activities and domestic outsourcing have had no such effects. This suggests that offshoring raises productivity by allowing firms to further specialise on their core activities.
The estimated productivity gains are in particular driven by offshoring to low-wage countries, and by the gains of multinational firms. For future research it would be desirable to use detailed firm level data on offshoring and domestic outsourcing and analyse the reasons behind the heterogeneous effects observed in this study. Standard errors clustered at the country-industry level in parentheses. Instrumental variables are 1) the weighted average of world offshoring in t and t-1 for each of the offshoring variables, and 2) each of these instruments interacted with the dummy for multinational activity. *** (**; *) denote significance at the one (five; ten) per cent level. The dependent variable labour productivity in column (1) is defined as value added per employee. The dependent variable TFP-FE in column (2) is a measure of total factor productivity derived from first-stage TFP regressions that include firm fixed effects. In column (3) to (6) the empirical model is estimated on different subsamples: the group of non-multinational firms (column 3), the group of multinational firms (column 4), firms in all countries except for Spain and Italy (column 5), and all firmyears between 2001 and 2008 (column 6). Standard errors clustered at the country-industry level in parentheses.. *** (**; *) denote significance at the one (five; ten) per cent level. Offshoring is distinguished into offshoring from high-wage countries (HighCore, HighNoncore, HighService) and offshoring from low-wage countries (LowCore, LowNoncore, LowService). The group of high-wage countries comprises the nine European countries under analysis in this study, as well as further European and non-European high-wage countries. Standard errors clustered at the country-industry level in parentheses.. *** (**; *) denote significance at the one (five; ten) per cent level. 
